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          NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-2763 
 ___________ 
 
MEI YUN CHEN, 
  Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
  Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (A088-778-603) 
 Immigration Judge: Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 10, 2013 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, VANASKIE and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: January 29, 2013 ) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Mei Yun Chen, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of a final 
removal order in which the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed the denial of 
Chen‟s applications for relief from removal.  We will deny the petition for review.   
  Chen entered the United States in 2000 without inspection.  She later married 
another Chinese national, and the couple now has two U.S.-born children.  In proceedings 
before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which were brought jointly against Chen and her 
husband, Chen conceded removability as an alien present without being admitted or 
paroled, and she pursued requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”) protection.  Chen testified that she fears returning to China now 
that she has two children because she (or her husband) will be sterilized and forced to pay 
onerous fines for having violated China‟s one-child family planning policy.   
 The IJ determined that Chen and her husband failed to meet their burden of proof 
for relief from removal.  The BIA agreed, holding that Chen and her husband did not 
establish an objectively reasonable possibility that they face forcible sterilization or other 
persecution.  Chen, proceeding without her husband, timely filed this petition for review. 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  When, as here, “the BIA issues its 
own decision on the merits, rather than a summary affirmance, we review its decision, 
not that of the IJ.”  Hanif v. Att‟y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 2012).  We consider 
the IJ‟s decision “only insofar as the BIA deferred to it.”  Roye v. Att‟y Gen., 693 F.3d 
333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012).  We review factual findings for substantial evidence, while legal 
determinations are reviewed de novo.  Hanif, 694 F.3d at 483.
1
   
 Chen argues that the BIA erred because the evidence supports her claimed fear of 
                                                 
1
 Because Chen does not argue in her opening brief that the BIA erred in denying her 
CAT claim, that issue is waived.  See Garcia v. Att‟y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 502 (3d Cir. 
2011).  Our review is limited to Chen‟s asylum and withholding of removal claims.   
 
 persecution due to the birth of her two children.  In particular, she contends that she 
established a basis for relief through her testimony, which both the IJ and the BIA 
accepted as credible, and the documentary evidence.  Chen maintains that local family 
planning policy in her native Fujian Province requires that she undergo sterilization, and 
that she also faces “an enormous fine which would amount to persecution.”  Brief at 8.  
Chen asserts that she has an objective basis for fearing persecution, and that the “agency 
erred when it failed to credit [her] direct evidentiary documents.”  Id. at 10.   
 We discern no error in the BIA‟s analysis.  To establish a well-founded fear of 
future persecution, Chen had to prove both a subjective fear that she will be persecuted in 
China, and “„that a reasonable person in [her] position would fear persecution, either 
because [s]he would be individually singled out for persecution or because there is a 
pattern or practice in [her] home country of persecution against a group of which [s]he is 
a member.‟”  Khan v. Att‟y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 496 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Huang v. 
Att‟y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 381 (3d Cir. 2010)).   
 The BIA noted and discussed Chen‟s numerous documentary submissions, it 
highlighted various shortcomings in the evidence, and it concluded that Chen‟s case 
cannot be distinguished from prior cases in which the BIA had rejected similar claims.  
See Matter of J-W-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 185 (BIA 2007); Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 247 (BIA 2007).  Among other things, the BIA agreed with the IJ that Chen‟s 
family planning committee letters are unreliable inasmuch as they are unsigned and 
unauthenticated, and such documentation from Fujian Province “is subject to wide-spread 
 fabrication and fraud.”  A.R. at 4.  The BIA also found that letters from Chen‟s family 
members in China deserve minimal evidentiary weight because they contain hearsay and 
the authors were unavailable for cross-examination.  The BIA concluded, moreover, that 
these letters and family planning documents do little to prove that Chen would likely face 
persecution as a returning national with children born in the United States, and that many 
of the other documents of record were simply “unreliable, contradicted by reliable 
sources, ... irrelevant, or ... out of date.”  A.R. at 4-5.   
 The BIA also looked to the country condition and other government reports in the 
record, and it found that they do not support a finding that individuals in Chen‟s situation 
experience forced sterilization.  With regard to possible fines, the BIA determined that, 
although “[t]here is evidence that fines are levied against Chinese citizens residing in 
China who violate the coercive population control policy,” Chen did not show “that such 
fines, if imposed, would be so onerous as to rise to the level of persecution.”  A.R. at 5.   
 Findings regarding an alien‟s fear of future persecution are factual determinations, 
and are therefore reviewed for substantial evidence.  Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 
508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).  In applying this deferential standard of review, we must accept 
the BIA‟s determinations “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 
conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  “So long as the BIA‟s decision is 
supported by „reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as 
a whole,‟ we will not disturb the BIA‟s disposition of the case.”  Chavarria, 446 F.3d at 
515 (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)). 
  Chen has not shown that the record compels a finding that she has an objectively 
reasonable fear of persecution.  Chen argues that “[t]he evidence in the record indicates 
that the usual response to a violation of the [one-child] policy is sterilization.”  Brief at 7-
8.  As the BIA explained, however, there is ample evidence, particularly in the country 
condition and other government reports, to support a contrary finding that Chen is not 
reasonably likely to suffer forced sterilization.  Chen maintains that she also faces an 
onerous fine, and she points in particular to the 2009 State Department Human Rights 
Report, which notes that “[t]he law requires each person in a couple that has an 
unapproved child to pay a „social compensation fee,‟ which can reach 10 times a person‟s 
annual disposable income.”  A.R. at 366.  This statement, however, does not conclusively 
establish the nature of any fine that would be levied against Chen, nor does the record as 
a whole compel a finding that Chen faces “the deliberate imposition of severe economic 
disadvantage which threatens [her] life or freedom.”  Li v. Att‟y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 168 
(3d Cir. 2005); cf. Ying Chen v. Att‟y Gen., 676 F.3d 112, 117 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding 
that record did not compel a finding that petitioner herself faced the prospect of fines in 
China rising to the level of persecution).   
 Finally, Chen challenges the BIA‟s rejection of certain of her documents for lack 
of authentication, suggests that the IJ engaged in speculation, and contends that the 
agency failed to give proper weight to her evidence.  Brief at 10-12.  We find no record 
support for these contentions, and they are belied in any event by the substantial evidence 
supporting the decision to deny Chen‟s request for asylum.  Because withholding of 
 removal carries a higher burden of proof than asylum, Chen‟s request for that relief was 
properly denied, as well.  See Ying Chen, 676 F.3d at 117. 
 Based on the foregoing, we will deny the petition for review.  
